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The goal of this study is to empirically assess the influence of the board of directors’ work 
experience diversity on the performance of Russian non-public companies. The board work 
experience diversity is measured by the diversity index proposed by the authors, as well as by 
the number of work experience types and categories. Russian boards are characterized by a 
low level of diversity, directors with work experience in the same company prevail, on the sec-
ond and third places are the experience in other enterprises in the industry and the experience 
in the group of related companies. It has been established that there are no prevailing combi-
nations of experience in industrial companies. A positive influence of the directors’ work ex-
perience diversity on the increase of companies’ return on capital from 2017 to 2019 was found. 
The analysis is based on the data from a 2018 survey of industrial managers conducted by the 
Higher School of Economics.
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INTRODUCTION 
There are different approaches to the analysis 
of the activities of boards of directors 
(BoD): researchers look at the composition 
of the boards, their functions and areas 
of activity. Evaluating BoD performance 
is essential for the understanding of the 
corporate governance and its impact on the 
functioning of companies. L. Zingales notes 
the increased influence of human capital on 
company value [Zingales, 2000]; people can 
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have a particularly strong influence on the 
performance of an enterprise when they are at 
the top level of the company’s management, 
which includes the BoD [Fich, 2005]. For 
example, in a recent work, R. Hauser 
showed a significant impact of changes in 
the composition of the board of directors on 
the value of an enterprise using the example 
of companies that have gone through the 
processes of mergers and acquisitions [Hauser, 
2018].
To assess the corporate governance in 
different time periods, researchers studied 
BoD from the point of view of agency 
theory [Jensen, Meckling, 1976], resource 
dependence theory [Pfeffer, Salancik, 1978; 
Zahra, Pearce, 1989], institutional theory 
[DiMaggio, Powell, 1983], social relations 
theory [Granovetter, 1985], and stewardship 
theory [Davis, Schoorman, Donaldson, 1997]. 
In modern literature, researchers distinguish 
two main areas of activity of the board of 
directors — monitoring the activities of top 
management related to the agency theory 
and expert assistance to the manager and 
the owners related to the resource approach 
[Adams, Akyol, Verwijmeren, 2018; Dass 
et al., 2014; Drobetz et al., 2018]. These 
roles are not mutually exclusive; moreover, 
in successful companies, boards should 
combine both roles, since the knowledge 
and expertise of directors, allowing them 
to perform the resource function, also helps 
improve councils’ understanding of available 
information and facilitate monitoring of top 
management’s actions [Hermalin, Weisbach, 
2003; Adams, Ferreira, 2007; Brickley, 
Zimmerman, 2010].
Quite naturally, a question arises about 
the different work experience of directors, 
how it helps to perform a certain function 
and to combine assistance and monitoring 
tasks due to the diverse experience of BoD 
members. In addition, it is necessary to 
look at whether there are combinations of 
work experience that help directors in their 
actions in different directions, and whether 
different skills complement each other or, on 
the contrary, they interfere.
The goal of the study is to empirically 
assess the impact of the board of directors’ 
work experience diversity on the performance 
of Russian non-public companies, which 
can only be done using survey data, but not 
using the small number of available issuers’ 
reports. Following the work of [Adams, 
Akyol, Verwijmeren, 2018], it is assumed 
that there is no prevailing experience 
or its combinations that provide better 
performance of companies. Further, the 
survey data is used to verify the previously 
obtained results of studies of the influence 
of different combinations of the directors’ 
experience [Anderson et al., 2011; Knyazeva, 
Knyazeva, Raheja, 2013; Adams, Akyol, 
Verwijmeren, 2018; Bernile, Bhagwat, 
Yonker, 2018]. In the previously mentioned 
papers, data of public companies was used; 
they examined the influence of a variety of 
directors’ experiences on market assessment 
of firms’ performance, such as the Tobin 
coefficient. This study deals mainly with 
non-public industrial companies, the owners 
of which seek to increase the profitability of 
their investments in the company, therefore, 
the dependent variable is not the value of 
companies, but the return on capital of these 
companies. For hypotheses, it is assumed that 
the diversity of directors’ work experience 
has a positive effect on the return on capital 
and that there are no prevailing combinations 
of work experience inherent in all companies 
in the sample.
The analysis is based on the data from a 
survey of industrial managers conducted by 
the Higher School of Economics in 2018. 
The survey covered 1 716 companies in 20 
sectors of economic activity, which were then 
aggregated into 9 manufacturing industries, 
and included 635 companies (both joint-stock 
companies and limited liability companies), 
the top management representatives of which 
confirmed the presence of BoD. Calculations 
were based on unweighted data. To obtain 
consistent statistical results, several data 
analysis methods were used: factor analysis, 
a linear OLS regression, binary choice models 
(probit model).
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The article includes three sections. The 
first section covers contemporary empirical 
research of the influence of different work 
experience and qualities of directors on 
the firm performance. The second section 
describes the research methodology, including 
a description of hypotheses, data, methods, 
and models used. The third section presents 
the results of empirical studies, including 
factor analysis of relationships between types 
of work experience and regression estimates 
of the impact of the work experience diversity 
of the board of directors on the companies’ 
return on capital. In conclusion, we will 
summarize the results of the analysis.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
A large number of empirical studies of the 
influence of directors’ certain qualities and 
skills on the performance of companies show 
mixed results. In general, the following 
estimates of the impact of industry experience 
on the value of publicly traded companies are 
based on data from US firms (unless otherwise 
noted). N. Dass with coauthors [Dass et al., 
2014] believe that the directors’ experience 
in a related industry (from the supplier or 
consumer side) is one of the main factors for 
successful corporate governance and growth 
of company value. The effect is especially 
significant when information asymmetries 
are present, as this work experience helps 
to overcome industry shocks and shorten 
the working capital cycle. Researchers 
believe that experience in related industries 
brings significant gaps in knowledge about 
these industries to the BoD, as well as the 
necessary connections with participants in 
related markets. It is this knowledge that 
makes it possible to predict market conditions 
and trends, which allows to better use the 
factors of production and avoid shocks 
from suppliers or consumers. W. Drobetz 
with coauthors [Drobetz et al., 2018] come 
to similar conclusions: it is the industry 
experience of independent directors that 
allows boards to do both monitoring and 
their resource function better. In this paper, 
researchers have shown the positive impact of 
the proportion of independent directors with 
industry experience on the value of industrial 
companies included in the S&P1500 index.
In contrast to the aforementioned works, 
S. Kang with coauthors note the importance 
of industry experience only in combination 
with experience as a chief executive officer 
(CEO). According to the authors, only 
a combination of a general management 
understanding of business operations and 
specific industry knowledge allows a board 
member to define and implement a company’s 
growth strategy. Otherwise, if the director 
has industry experience only, he will not be 
able to fulfill his or her resource function, 
since, without the effective communication 
experience and a deep understanding of the 
“political” situation within the board, the 
director will not be able to convey his or her 
view on the situation [Kang, Kim, Lu, 2018].
CEO experience also has a mixed effect on a 
company’s performance. In a 2005 paper, Fich 
shows that in successfully growing companies, 
there are members of the board of directors 
who serve as the CEO of another company 
[Fich, 2005]. During the event study, the 
author demonstrates that the inclusion of 
another company’s executive in the board of 
directors leads to the cumulative abnormal 
return of the stock of the given enterprise. 
Thus, the managerial experience of an outside 
director is viewed as unique expertise that 
adds value to the company. In [Fahlenbrach, 
Low, Stulz, 2010] the results turned out to be 
the opposite — the authors could not reject 
the hypothesis that managerial experience (as 
a CEO in other enterprises) had no influence 
on the company’s operating performance 
indicators. In particular, the authors were 
unable to identify the positive impact of 
CEO experience on board decisions such as 
changing CEOs, taking over another firm, or 
determining CEO compensation.
Contradictory results are shown in studies 
of the independence of directors on boards. 
According to theoretical assumptions, the 
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directors’ independence can lead to both an 
increase and a decrease in the company’s 
performance. Improved monitoring of 
management actions, reduced likelihood 
of collusion, and greater opportunities in 
terms of directors’ connections, resources, 
and skills are seen as the main benefits of 
directors’ independence. The drawback of a 
larger proportion of independent directors 
may be the lack of understanding and 
interaction within the board. In the study 
[Cavaco et al., 2017], which was done based 
on French company data, it was shown that 
the factor of independence itself negatively 
affects the performance of the company, 
although the effect decreases if the director 
has expertise in this industry. The authors 
attribute this effect to the informational 
deficit that independent directors face since 
the executive director will not necessarily 
share company-specific data. In contrast, one 
study of firms in developing countries showed 
a positive relationship between the power of 
an independent director and firm value [Zhu 
et al., 2016].
The presence of directors’ financial 
expertise also does not give a clear effect. 
On the one hand, in theory, the presence of 
financial expertise allows the BoD to receive 
additional information about the risks of 
financial transactions, which contributes to 
better performance of the top management 
monitoring function. On the other hand, 
information about government guarantees 
for the banking system allows directors to 
put pressure on top management and make 
riskier decisions if it is in the interests of 
shareholders [Minton, Taillard, Williamson, 
2014]. A study [Güner, Malmendier, Tate, 
2008] shows that the presence of financial 
experts in the BoD increases access to loans, 
especially for banks that are closely associated 
with expert directors. However, in most cases, 
enterprises with less financial constraints 
and worse opportunities get access, which the 
authors explain by the actions of the lending 
bank. A more recent work [Minton, Taillard, 
Williamson, 2014] found that the presence of 
financial experts on the boards significantly 
worsened the performance of companies in 
the financial sector during the 2007–2008 
crisis. Firstly, researchers associate this with 
knowledge of complex financial instruments 
and their habitual use by financial experts, 
which leads to higher risk-taking. Another 
potential explanation is that financial experts 
represent the interests of shareholders and 
understand the residual nature of their 
claims, which leads to participation in 
projects with excessive risk.
The political experience of directors also 
has different impacts on the company’s 
value. A. Agrawal and C. Knober argue that 
directors with experience in politics play 
a large role on the boards of government-
affiliated companies, for example, if the 
company is involved in public procurement 
processes or if the government is actively 
regulating the market. The authors also 
show that in the American manufacturing 
industry in the 1990s, the importance of 
politically experienced directors increased 
with increased market competition [Agrawal, 
Knoeber, 2001]. E. Goldman and coauthors 
obtained interesting results when analyzing 
companies from the S&P500 list — with 
a Republican director on the board and no 
directors with opposing political views, the 
company’s value increased after a Republican 
won the presidential election. Companies with 
Democratic directors, on the other hand, 
showed negative cumulative excess returns 
on stocks. Researchers also found positive 
investor reactions and rising company values 
in response to news of the appointment of a 
politically experienced director [Goldman, 
Rocholl, So, 2009]. On the contrary, the 
negative influence of the political preferences 
of directors on the company’s value was found 
in the study [Lee, Lee, Nagarajan, 2014]. 
In this work, the researchers developed an 
index of the similarity of political preferences 
of board members and the companies’ top 
management and showed that high similarity 
in political views leads to lower performance 
of companies, weaker compensation schemes, 
and an increased likelihood of fraudulent 
schemes within corporations.
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In this study, we do not consider gender 
diversity issues. However, in the modern 
literature on corporate governance, there 
are many studies devoted to this topic. 
This is largely due to the changing legal 
regulation of corporate governance, according 
to which in some developed countries the 
board of directors should have a certain 
minimum percentage of women directors. 
The conflicting results of Western studies can 
be found in the works [Adams, Ferreira, 2009; 
Cruz et al., 2019], for Russian companies a 
detailed analysis is presented in [Garanina, 
Muravyev, 2018].
Based on a number of studies, only one 
general conclusion can be drawn — the 
influence of work experience or certain skills 
of directors cannot be considered in isolation 
from other factors. The contradictions in 
the results can be explained by the mutual 
influence of factors — the ability of one skill 
to influence the company’s performance 
depends on the presence of other qualities 
of the board members [Adams, Akyol, 
Verwijmeren, 2018; Knight et al., 1999; 
Pelled, Eisenhardt, Xin, 1999]. In the 
literature, there are two explanations for 
the mutual influence. On the one hand, 
having similar qualities and skills simplifies 
the interaction between directors, but they 
may lack an alternative approach and points 
of view to make effective decisions. On the 
other hand, having different experience on 
boards allows companies to be more productive 
and identify better solutions to a problem, 
but overly different experience can lead to 
misunderstandings and controversy [Murray, 
1989; Milliken, Martins, 1996]. For example, 
in a 2017 theoretical paper, L. Garlappi, R. 
Giammarino and A. Lazrak showed that the 
current diversity in an investment decision-
maker seriously increases the likelihood of 
future disputes between agents, which in 
turn leads to rejection of good investment 
opportunities [Garlappi, Giammarino, Lazrak, 
2017]. Differences in the skills and experience 
of directors can also significantly lengthen 
the decision-making period, leading to 
inefficiency [Hambrick, Cho, Chen, 1996].
Since the skills of directors influence each 
other, some researchers propose to evaluate 
the multidirectional effects of characteristics 
of board members through a common 
indicator of diversity. The results of such 
studies are also highly controversial. A study 
by R. Anderson and coauthors shows both 
multidirectional effects. On the one hand, in 
American industrial companies with a complex 
organizational structure a greater variety 
of directors’ qualities, skills and experience 
leads to better monitoring of the actions 
of top management and positively affects 
the assessment of companies by investors. 
On the other hand, an excessive variety of 
qualities of board members leads to conflicts 
and negatively affects the value of companies 
in companies with a simpler structure. 
Interestingly, a firm’s performance is more 
influenced by the diversity of work experience 
and education than by age, ethnicity, or gender 
ratio within boards [Anderson et al., 2011]. 
In an empirical study in 2013, A. Knyazeva, 
D. Knyazeva and C. Raheja showed a negative 
impact of the diversity of the qualities of 
directors on the value of companies, which was 
explained by the lack of focus on the boards 
[Knyazeva, Knyazeva, Raheja, 2013]. R. 
Adams, A. Akyol and P. Verwijmeren found 
a negative impact of diversity on company 
performance [Adams, Akyol, Verwijmeren, 
2018], while G. Bernile and coauthors noted a 
significant positive effect of greater diversity 
in the qualities of directors and the absence of 
any influence of factors separately [Bernile, 
Bhagwat, Yonker, 2018].
This paper examines the relationship 
between the experience of directors and the 
performance of Russian companies, therefore 
the findings of some of the few studies on 
Russia should be mentioned which are more 
focused on the resource function of BoD. 
T. Dolgopyatova with coauthors found an 
increasing influence of the board of directors 
in a large Russian public company associated 
with changes in the economic conditions and 
the transformation of the company’s business 
model [Dolgopyatova et al., 2015a; 2015b]. 
With the help of a case study, the authors 
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identified the role of directors’ contribution 
to the development of the company, especially 
when making strategic decisions.
The influence of various characteristics 
of board members in Russian companies, 
including non-public ones, was analyzed 
in [Dulyak, 2015]. The author tried to 
assess the influence of such factors as 
the directors’ experience in government 
bodies, experience in foreign companies, 
the proportion of directors with higher 
education, and the age of the BoD chairman. 
Empirical analysis showed no relationship 
with firm performance, despite the theoretical 
arguments. Perhaps this is an illustration of 
the influence of the factor of diversity, which 
was considered by M. Benkewitz, R. Adams, 
and other authors [Bankewitz, 2016; Adams, 
Akyol, Verwijmeren, 2018]. At the same time, 
Yu. Dulyak confirmed the hypothesis of a 
positive relationship between experience in 
this industry and the company’s performance, 
as well as the hypothesis of the positive impact 
of the share of executive directors [Dulyak, 
2015]. Another interesting result related to 
the participation of the current BoD chairman 
in the management of another company: the 
author revealed a negative relationship with 
the firm’s activities, which is similar, for 
example, with the results of Hauser’s study 
[Hauser, 2018].
A. Muravyev identified the main 
structural characteristics of the board for 
public Russian companies and assessed their 
impact on the performance of the companies. 
There was no statistically significant effect 
of the BoD size and the average age of board 
members on the performance indicators. 
The influence of the proportion of directors 
affiliated with the company and directors 
with political connections was also not found. 
However, an increase in the share of foreign 
directors had a positive effect on the ratio of 
market value to accounting value [Muravyev, 
2017].
In a recent paper based on data from 
Russian companies, I. Berezinets, Yu. Ilina 
and A. Loginova investigated the impact 
of social capital of the board of directors, 
company size, and board size on company 
performance. As various characteristics 
of social capital, the average number of 
positions held by a director in the BoD of 
other companies is used, including separately 
calculated for executive, non-executive, 
independent, and affiliated directors. The 
authors concluded that an increase in the 
participation of directors in the board of 
directors of other companies negatively 
affects the performance of companies 
since this factor is directly related to the 
employment of the director and his or 
her limited opportunities for effective 
participation in the company’s management, 
which in turn leads to a negative impact on 
its financial indicators. It is interesting 
that the participation of a director in the 
BoD of other companies in the past, on the 
contrary, has a positive effect on indicators. 
Berezinets and coauthors explain this from 
the point of view of the resource theory — 
the established connections and acquired 
experience contribute to further access to 
important opportunities and resources, which 
reduces the company’s transaction costs 
[Berezinets, Ilina, Loginova, 2019].
A 2020 survey of boards of directors 
in mid-sized Russian companies revealed 
interesting changes in corporate governance. 
Compared to 2015, the owners of non-public 
companies have an increased interest in 
creating a board of directors, partly due to the 
desire to obtain an alternative independent 
point of view and transfer operational 
management to professional managers. 
Besides, tendencies of a decrease in the 
concentration of ownership and an increase 
in the role of councils were revealed [Research 
of corporate governance practices…, 2020].
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOgY
2.1. Hypotheses and data
As discussed above, the impact of different 
experience types varies from significantly 
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positive to significantly negative, depending 
on the specifics of the activities of public 
companies and external conditions. In this 
regard, it is assumed that the availability of 
different work experiences will depend on the 
needs of the business for non-public companies 
as well, which — due to the complexity of 
obtaining data — have hardly been studied 
previously.
Some boards may have directors with 
multiple work experience, while others do not. 
Depending on the companies’ characteristics, 
some work experience may cluster, however, 
no prevailing combinations of work experience 
are expected in Russian non-public companies. 
Then the main dimension of variation between 
different work experience is their diversity.
H1. There is no prevailing work 
experience and no prevailing work experience 
combinations in Russian industrial 
companies.
L. Zingales notes that in modern companies 
all stakeholders have influence, not just the 
main shareholders. The main task of corporate 
governance is to prevent conflicts between 
influence groups, otherwise, the company’s 
value is destroyed [Zingales, 2000]. When 
studying the reasons for creating a board of 
directors in Russian non-public companies, 
the requirements of creditor banks and access 
to the contacts of directors were identified 
[Research of corporate governance practices…, 
2020]. Board members should take into 
account the interests of all stakeholders, 
seek a compromise between solutions. To 
do this, you need to have a variety of skills 
and work experience. All other things being 
equal, in successful companies, having more 
stakeholders should lead to a more diverse 
directors’ work experience, that is, the 
relative level of diversity will be higher.
The companies included in the study 
are non-public, therefore, we will consider 
companies in which the return on capital is 
higher than the average for this sector as 
more successful.
H2. The degree of relative work experience 
diversity of the BoD is positively associated 
with companies’ return on capital.
The empirical study will use several control 
variables to assess the net effect of the relative 
diversity of work experience on enterprise 
profitability. In the literature that analyzed 
the role of BoD in companies, the model often 
includes indicators of company size (logarithm 
of sales, the logarithm of the number of 
employees), industry dummy variables, and 
the number of years since the company was 
founded [Adams, Ferreira, 2009; Cavaco et 
al., 2017; Bernile, Bhagwat, Yonker, 2018; 
Kang, Kim, Lu, 2018; Garanina, Muravyev, 
2018]. Some researchers also suggest taking 
into account the presence of a foreign owner 
[The New Economic School…, 2010]. The 
importance of combining ownership and 
management is also noted when considering 
Russian enterprises [Berezinets, Ilina, 
Cherkasskaya, 2013].
The age of an enterprise affects the 
performance of companies in different ways 
[Linck, Nettera, Yang, 2008; Kang, Kim, 
Lu, 2018]. The size of the enterprise and the 
number of markets in which the company 
is represented reflect the complexity of a 
business organization, which is advisable to 
control when assessing the role of the board 
of directors. From one point of view, foreign 
ownership may have a negative impact on 
Russian companies’ performance due to 
economic sanctions in 2014 which led to 
capital outflow. The introduction of sanctions 
accelerated the policy of import substitution 
in the Russian Federation, it led to more 
strict requirements for the localization of 
production of foreign companies in Russia, 
which in turn had an effect on the volume 
of state support. At the same time, the 
localization above a certain level may lead 
to additional costs, problems with quality 
and demand. From another point of view, 
A. Muravyev showed a positive effect of 
increase in foreign directors share in the BoD 
for public Russian companies [Muravyev, 
2017]. The combination of ownership and 
management may have a positive effect on the 
firm performance since it helps to eliminate 
agency problems and enables faster decision 
making in unstable conditions. The positive 
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relationship between combined ownership 
and control and Russian industrial firm 
competitiveness [Dolgopyatova, 2011] and 
positive relationship between executive 
and non-executive director ownership and 
public companies’ performance [Muravyev, 
Berezinets, Ilina, 2014] were shown.
The main data source is the database of 
the survey of manufacturing enterprises 
top management conducted by the Institute 
for Industrial and Market Studies (IIMS) of 
the National Research University Higher 
School of Economics (NRU HSE) in 2018 
(the fourth round of the Monitoring of the 
Competitiveness of Russian Enterprises), 
supplemented by the IIMS specialists with 
the financial and economic indicators of 
enterprises from the RUSLANA database. As 
part of the survey, more than 1 700 companies 
were selected from more than 100  000 
enterprises in the general population with 
10 or more employees to conduct formalized 
face-to-face interviews with top management 
representatives 1. The sample is stratified, 
zoned, with control of size groups, which 
ensured the representativeness of the general 
population in the context of size groups in 
terms of the number of employees and 20 
types of economic activity (All-Russian 
Classifier of Types of Economic Activity codes 
from 10 to 33 2, the distribution of companies 
is presented in Appendix, Figures 1 and 2). In 
this sample, 635 non-public companies were 
noted to have a BoD: near 37% of respondents 
had a position of CEO or executive director, 
about 51% were presented by directors or 
deputy directors on economic or financial 
issues, and 3% of respondents were members 
of the company management body. More than 
65% of all representatives were members of 
BoD.
1 The text of survey questionnaire can be found 
on the HSE University website. URL: https://iims.
hse.ru/rfge/meth (accessed: 09.11.2020).
2 All-Russian Classifier of Types of Economic 
Activity codes can be found on the Federal State 
Statistics Service website. URL: https://rosstat.gov.
ru/classification (accessed: 09.11.2020).
For each company the interview with 
one of the top managers was conducted, 
survey questionnaire was available before 
the interview upon request. In the survey, 
managers named groups of influence 
(stakeholders) that have a significant impact 
on the formation of the board composition, 
and also pointed out the experience of 
board members in different structures 
(in the company, government bodies, this 
industry, in the field of entrepreneurship) 
and highlighted areas of activity, which the 
BoD has a significant impact on (that is, the 
main tasks solved by the board).
2.2. Variables and descriptive 
statistics
The database consists of observations of 602 
companies, for which respondents noted the 
presence of different categories of directors’ 
work experience over the past 10 years (33 
respondents or 5.2% found it difficult to 
answer). Since there is no data on the size of 
the company’s board and the work experience 
of individual directors, the board of directors is 
considered as a whole, the collective experience 
of the board is analyzed (Table 1).
The survey data showed that directors 
with work experience in the same company 
prevail — it was noted by representatives of 
504 companies out of 602 (33 respondents 
refused to answer). On the second place is 
work experience in other companies in the 
industry, on the third place is work experience 
in the group of related companies. Regarding 
the number of types of work, more than half 
of the companies have directors with only 
one work experience (348 companies out of 
602), another quarter has directors with two 
types of experience. At the same time, out of 
155 companies who noted two types of work 
experience, about 40% noted work experience 
in the same company and other companies in 
this industry, 27% noted work experience in 
the same company and in a group of related 
companies, almost 15% noted work experience 
in the same company and in another industry. 
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In other words, one can see a shift in work 
experience towards insider experience and a 
low level of work experience diversity in the 
BoD of Russian industrial companies. The 
average board had 1.63 types of experience 
(the median is 1).
Some of the work experience types give 
the director similar competencies and skills. 
For example, work experience in the company 
and a group of related companies provides 
a similar understanding of the processes 
of this business, specific knowledge of 
a particular company, its strengths, and 
weaknesses. Work experience in other 
companies in the industry provides an 
additional understanding of the specifics of 
the industry, a similar understanding gives 
experience in related industries. Experience 
in various government bodies reflects the 
need or desirability of interacting with 
government representatives at various levels. 
Finally, both managerial experience and 
socio-political and educational experience 
intersect when the ability to organize a 
large number of different people for a 
well-coordinated work is required. In this 
regard, all 9 types of work experience can 
be grouped into 4 categories: (1) insiders 
(experience in the company and the group of 
related companies); (2) external industrial 
experience (in this industry and another); 
(3) experience in government bodies (federal, 
regional and municipal, law enforcement 
agencies); (4) organizational experience 
(managerial experience and experience in 
socio-political, scientific and educational, 
etc. activities). The experience categories 
mean in the sample is 1.40 (the median is 1).
Table 1
BoD collective work experience of companies
Work experience type
Number of work experience types Total 
number of 
companies *1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
In the company 280 134 72 15 1 1 0 0 1 504 (83.7)
In the group of related 
companies 22 50 38 11 1 1 0 0 1 124 (20.6)
In other companies in the 
industry 24 74 60 14 1 1 0 0 1 175 (29.0)
In other industries 7 33 35 14 2 1 0 0 1 93 (15.4)
In federal legislative or 
executive authorities 1 2 8 1 1 0 0 0 1 14 (2.3)
In regional / municipal 
executive or legislative 
authorities
4 1 7 0 1 0 0 0 1 14 (2.3)
In the law enforcement, 
military or security agencies 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 (0.01)
In entrepreneurship or 
management of other 
companies
10 12 16 5 2 1 0 0 1 47 (7.8)
In activities that are 
socio-political, scientific, 
educational
0 3 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 8 (1.3)
Total companies that noted 
the number of types of expe-
rience
348 155 80 15 2 1 0 0 1 602
N o t e: * column reports the absolute number of answers and the proportion of positive answers (in brackets, %).
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Based on the survey data, three indicators 
of the work experience diversity were 
calculated: the number of types of experience 
in the company’s board of directors, the 
number of categories of experience, and 
diversity index based on the Herfindahl–
Hirschman index proposed by the authors. 
When calculating the diversity index for 
each category, “saturation” was taken into 
account, that is, the share of the presented 
experience in this category. At the same 
time, the diversity index takes into account 
the “bias” towards any category of work 
experience through the introduction of a 
correction factor k.
The formula of the proposed index is the 
following:
I= 



























where k is a correction factor.
Below (in Table 2) a comparison of all com-
binations of work experience categories, di-
versity index and the number of work experi-
ence types found in 602 industrial companies 
are presented (see the box for an explanation 
of the index calculation).
Explanations for the calculation of the director’s work  
experience diversity index
With a single type of work experience (combinations from 1 to 4), the diversity index 
is not of particular interest, since in the case of one BoD work experience, the “saturation” 
of experience in a certain category is almost the same (except for experience in the third 
category of “authorities”, the maximum number in which is three). However, for the two 
experiences, the differences between companies become visible. For example, in the case 
of a combination of 5 in the company’s board of directors, there are 2 types of work expe-
rience in the first category: experience in the company and experience in a group of re-
lated companies. For combination 6, there are two experiences in the BoD in the second 
category: experience in this industry and others. In terms of diversity, such combinations 
should yield the same index value, since companies have directors with only one category 
of work experience. Combination 7 gives a more diverse experience and a higher index 
value: there are directors with insider experience and experience in government. With an 
increase in the number of types of work experience in the BoD, the difference between the 
diversity index and the number of experience types increases. Consider combinations 22 
through 25 that correspond to the same number of director experience types. The combi-
nation 22 uses two types of insider experience and two types of industrial experience. The 
23-rd and 24-th reflect more diversity as they represent three categories of experience: 
insider, industrial, and organizational. The highest variety for 4 types of work experience 
is presented for a combination 25 — this company has directors with experience in each 
of the four categories. In general, an increase in the number of types of board work expe-
rience speaks of diversity, but in the case of similar types of experience, the diversity 
index gives more information.
When constructing the index, an assumption was made about the degree of diversity. 
For example, combinations 6 and 7 represent two work experiences, but combination 6 
represents only industrial experience, and combination 7 represents experience in two 
categories. For this study, it was assumed that combination 7 has a higher degree of di-
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Table 2
Combinations of work experience, diversity index and the number of work  
experience types presented in the BoD
Combination 
number
Work experience category* Diversity index Number of work experience types
1 2 3 4 Value Frequency Value Frequency
1 0 0 1 0 0.028 5
1 348
2 0 1 0 0
0.063 3433 1 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 1
5 2 0 0 0
0.160 48
2 155
6 0 2 0 0
7 1 0 1 0 0.181 4
8 1 1 0 0
0.250 1039 0 1 0 1
10 1 0 0 1
11 1 0 2 0 0.347 1
3 80
12 2 0 1 0
0.376 4
13 0 2 1 0
14 0 2 0 1
0.445 51
15 2 1 0 0
16 2 0 0 1
17 1 2 0 0
18 1 1 1 0
0.458 1019 1 0 1 1
20 0 1 1 1
21 1 1 0 1 0.563 14
versity than combination 6. For this, a correction factor (0.8) was introduced into the di-
versity index formula, which reduces the contribution of the more concentrated experience. 
For example, the maximum number of work experience types in the category of insider 
experience is two — experience in the company and experience in a group of related com-
panies. If only one of them is represented in the company, the saturation of experience in 
this category is 1/2. If both types of experience are represented in the company, then the 
saturation for this category is 0.8 = 2/2×0.8. Similarly, if in the category of work experi-
ence in government bodies there are two types of experience out of three possible, then the 
saturation of experience in this category is 2/3; if there are three types of work experience 
in government bodies, then the saturation is 0.8 = 3/3×0.8. The choice of the value of the 
correction factor is due to the value of saturation — the maximum saturation should be 
less than one (2/2 or 3/3), but above the average saturation (1/2 or 2/3). Thus, for this 
study, it was possible to use any value from 2/3 to 1 (we took a coefficient of 0.8).
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In more efficient companies, more stake-
holders should contribute to a greater diver-
sity of directors’ experience. To take into 
account the number of influence groups on 
the composition of the board, three relative 
indicators of the diversity of experience were 
calculated: the ratio of the number of work 
experience types to the number of stakehold-
ers, the ratio of the number of work experi-
ence categories and the diversity index to the 
number of stakeholders.
To assess the performance of companies, 
the return on shareholders’ funds’ ratio 
(ROSF) was used. Since we are considering 
industrial companies, the production of which 
is often capital-intensive, we additionally 
analyzed the company’s return on capital 
employed (ROCE), which includes long-term 
liabilities. Based on the return on capital 
ratios, the deviations of the company’s return 
on capital from the sector average for 2017 
and 2019 were calculated. The sector average 
return on capital was calculated using data 
from 635 companies in the survey for each of 
20 types of economic activity. Further, the 
change in the return on capital for two years 
was calculated as the difference between the 
values for 2019 and 2017.
Additionally, binary variables of the return 
on capital were created, reflecting the positive 
or negative change in the deviation from the 
average for the sector for two years: the vari-
able takes on the value 1 if the company’s re-
turn on capital relative to the average for the 
industry has increased over the period, and 
the value is 0 if the company’s performance 
has worsened. Table 3 provides descriptive 
statistics of the dependent and independent 
variables.
2.3. Methods and models 
To test hypothesis H1 that there are no pre-
vailing work experience and its combinations, 
factor analysis was used. It detects the pres-
ence of unobservable factors that may lead 
to combinations of work experience. The 
factor analysis of the work experience types 
is based on approaches to the analysis of the 
personal characteristics of directors on 
boards and CEOs in [Kaplan, Klebanov, 
Sorensen, 2012; Kaplan, Sorensen, 2017; 
Adams, Akyol, Verwijmeren, 2018]. 
Following the work of [Adams, Akyol, 
Verwijmeren, 2018], the iterated principal 
axis method was used.
Combination 
number
Work experience category* Diversity index Number of work experience types
1 2 3 4 Value Frequency Value Frequency
22 2 2 0 0 0.640 10
4 15
23 2 1 0 1
0.855 4
24 1 2 0 1
25 1 1 1 1 0.861 1
26 1 2 0 2 1.148 1
5 2
27 1 1 2 1 1.194 1
28 2 2 1 1 1.641 1 6 1
29 2 2 3 2 2.560 1 9 1
N o t es: a work experience type is assigned a value of “1” if at least one director on the board has worked in 
the area in the past 10 years; * column reports the number of work experience types within the given category (for 
categories 1, 2 and 4 there could be 0.1 or 2 work experience types; for category 3 there could be 0.1, 2 or 3 work 
experience types).
Table 2 (end)
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Median Mean Minimum Maximum Standard deviation Variable type
Firm characteristics
Change in the devia-
tion of ROSF from 
the sector average 
over 2 years, %
384 3.24 –0.71 –890.53 782.92 84.19 Quantitative
Binary variable of the 
change in the devia-
tion of ROSF from 
the sector average 
over 2 years
384 1.00 0.56 0 1 0.50 Dummy
Deviation of ROSF 
from the sector 
average in 2017, %
519 –4.98 0.00 –762.22 457.33 72.34 Quantitative
Change in the devia-
tion of ROCE from 
the sector average 
over 2 years, %
413 5.64 –2.17 –1 059.47 395.56 85.82 Quantitative
Binary variable of the 
change in the devia-
tion of ROCE from 
the sector average 
over 2 years
413 1.00 0.61 0 1 0.49 Dummy
Deviation of ROCE 
from the sector 
average in 2017, %
543 –5.14 0.08 –483.52 671.86 60.16 Quantitative
Presence of foreign 
ownership
612 0 0.09 0 1 0.28 Dummy
Management sepa-
rated from ownership
620 1.00 0.61 0 1 0.49 Dummy
Number of markets 632 1.00 1.50 1 3 0.71 Quantitative
Foundation year (1  — 
before 1992, 2  — 
1992–1998, 3  — 
1999–2008, 4  — 
2009–2013, 
5  — 2014–2018)
635 3 2.33 1 5 1.22 Ordinal
Firm size (number of 
employees in 2017)
568 230.50 626.24 10 23 916 1 679.57 Quantitative
Industries (9 groups), 
including:
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To test hypothesis H2, we assessed the 
change in the company’s return on capital 
over two years in response to changes in one 
out of three relative indicators of the board 
experience diversity and several control 
variables: deviation of return on capital 
from the sector average in 2017, firm size 
(logarithm of the number of employees in 
2017), belonging to one of the nine manu-
facturing industries, foundation year (or-
dinal variable), presence of foreign owner-
ship, separation of management from own-
ership, number of markets in which the 
company operates.
To test hypotheses about the relationship 
between the company’s return on capital 
and the directors’ experience diversity, two 
types of models were evaluated: a linear 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and 
a binary choice model (probit model).







Median Mean Minimum Maximum Standard deviation Variable type
food 635 0 0.17 0 1 0.38 Dummy
textiles and gar-
ments
635 0 0.06 0 1 0.24 Dummy
timber and wood-
working
635 0 0.08 0 1 0.27 Dummy
chemicals 635 0 0.14 0 1 0.35 Dummy
non-metallic 
products
635 0 0.10 0 1 0.31 Dummy
metals and fabri-
cated metal products
635 0 0.12 0 1 0.32 Dummy
machines and 
equipment
635 0 0.10 0 1 0.29 Dummy
electrical, electron-
ic, and optical 
equipment
635 0 0.11 0 1 0.32 Dummy
transport vehicles 
and equipment
635 0 0.11 0 1 0.32 Dummy
BoD characteristics (in absolute values)
Number of work 
experience types
602 1.00 1.63 1.00 9.00 0.90 Quantitative
Number of work 
experience categories
602 1.00 1.40 1.00 4.00 0.61 Quantitative
Diversity index 602 0.06 0.18 0.03 2.56 0.21 Quantitative
Number of stakehold-
ers
602 2.00 2.34 1.00 4.00 0.65 Quantitative
N o t es: calculations were made for a sample of 635 companies, whose respondents noted the presence of a board 
of directors; at the same time, respondents who found it difficult or avoided answering on each question were 
excluded.
Table 3 (end)
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Change in firm performancei=  
β0+ β1WEDi+β2Return on capital2017i+ 
β3Foreigni+β4MnOi+β5Nmarketsi+β6Sizei+
β7Yeari+ β8Industryi+βi,  (2)
where Change in firm performancei — the 
change in the deviation of ROSF (or ROCE) 
from the sector average from 2017 to 2019 for 
the company i; it can be expressed in absolute 
values or as a dummy (value 1 if the firm per-
formance relative to the average for the indus-
try has improved over the period, and the 
value is 0 if the firm performance has worsened 
or had the same dynamics as industry average); 
WEDi — a variable of the relative work experi-
ence diversity (the number of work experience 
types, or the number of categories, or the di-
versity index per stakeholder); Return on 
capital 2017i — deviation of return on capital 
from the sector average in 2017; Foreigni — 
dummy variable responsible for the presence 
of foreign ownership3; MnOi — dummy vari-
able responsible for the separation of manage-
ment from the ownership; Nmarketsi — the 
variable of the number of markets in which the 
company operates; Sizei — a variable of the 
size of the company (logarithm of the number 
of employees in 2017); Yeari — the foundation 
year; Industryi — a dummy variable showing 
which industry the i-th company belongs to; 
εi — random error of the company i.
3 Management is separate from the ownership 
when the CEO does not own shares of the company 
and he or she is not a member of the family that 
owns or controls the business; measured based on 
the subjective opinion of the respondent.
3. RESULTS OF  
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
3.1. Factor analysis of work 
experience diversity
During the preliminary testing the correla-
tions of work experience diversity, the number 
of stakeholders influencing the formation of 
the board of directors, the number of areas 
that the BoD influences, and the size of the 
company were calculated. If the data on the 
experience of the councils is informative, a 
positive relationship between the variables 
should be found: large companies are faced 
with a large number of issues that need to be 
addressed, which means that the board should 
have more competencies; a large number of 
stakeholders should lead to a greater number 
of directors representing the interests of 
individual groups, and therefore to a greater 
number of work experiences in the board; a 
high variety of BoD competencies allows solv-
ing a larger number of tasks.
The correlation table showed a positive 
relationship between the variables, the work 
experience revealed in the survey is informa-
tive (Table 4). It is impossible to accept the 
null hypothesis of no correlation between the 
variables.
Next, the links between different work 
experiences in the BoD were analyzed. The 
tetrachoric correlation matrix of nine differ-
ent types of work experience (see Table 5) 
shows little correlation between different 
Table 4
Correlations table
Variable Number of work experi-ence types
Number of work experi-
ence categories Diversity index
Number of stakeholders 0.228*** 0.184*** 0.219***
Number of areas 0.206*** 0.195*** 0.213***
Firm Size 0.128*** 0.080** 0.115***
N o t es: Spearman’s correlation coefficient was used; ***, ** indicate statistical significance at the 1 and 5% 
respectively.
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types of work experience, apart from work 
experience in government.
Since in the overwhelming majority of 
companies there are directors with experience 
in the company (top management representa-
tives) in the BoD, 8 types of experience were 
left for factor analysis: experience in the 
group of related companies, in other compa-
nies in the industry, in other industries, in 
the government authorities (3 types), mana-
gerial experience and experience in social, 
political, scientific and educational activities.
Three methods were used to determine the 
required number of factors: a scree plot anal-
ysis, parallel analysis, and eigenvalues analy-
sis using the Kaiser–Harris test.
According to the scree plot, only the factors 
before the point inflexion should be used, which 
in this case corresponds to one factor. The 
second criterion, parallel analysis, offers some 
factors for which the eigenvalues calculated 
from real data are larger than the averaged 
eigenvalues for a set of random data matrices 
(FA simulated data). According to the second 
criterion, four factors should be taken. 
According to the Kaiser–Harris rule, one 
should use only those factors whose eigenval-
ues are greater than zero, which corresponds 
to the use of four factors (see Figure).
The preliminary analysis gave mixed re-
sults, so two sets of factors were used. Table 6 
shows the results of the iterated principal 
axis analysis for four and one factors. Taking 
into account four factors gives a low commu-
nality of all initial variables, and the propor-
tion of cumulative variance explained by the 
factors is 65%. Each variable of work experi-
ence is positively correlated with the first 
factor, the ratio ranges from 32 to 94%. The 
eigenvalue of the first factor is almost three 
times higher than the next, which indicates 
its higher load compared to the rest. Using 
one factor gives similar results. It is posi-
tively correlated with all types of work expe-
rience — the influence ranges from 26 to 96%, 
but it explains only 33% of the variance. This 
suggests that some boards have a large num-
ber of different types of work, while others, 
on the contrary, have a small variety of expe-
rience.
Table 5
Tetrachoric correlations of work experience types
N Type 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 In the company 1.00
2




In other companies in the 
industry
–0.29 0.17 1.00
4 In other industries –0.20 0.02 0.32 1.00
5 In federal authorities –0.18 0.11 –0.10 0.36 1.00
6
In regional / municipal  
authorities
–0.26 0.02 0.00 0.19 0.56 1.00
7 In the law enforcement agencies –0.12 0.49 0.41 0.36 0.50 0.49 1.00
8
In entrepreneurship or other 
business management
–0.50 0.02 0.14 0.37 0.46 0.16 0.49 1.00
9
In social, political, scientific 
and educational activities
–0.12 0.06 0.33 0.28 0.35 0.35 0.59 0.30 1.00
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Table 6
Results of factor analysis
Work experience type
Four factors One factor
F1 F2 F3 F4 h2 u2 F1 h2 u2
In the group of related 
companies
0.32 0.45 –0.64 0.13 0.74 0.26 0.26 0.066 0.934
In other companies in the 
industry
0.39 0.66 0.38 –0.21 0.77 0.23 0.32 0.101 0.899
In other industries 0.47 0.02 0.26 0.10 0.30 0.70 0.48 0.227 0.773
In federal legislative or 
executive authorities
0.66 –0.45 –0.08 0.13 0.67 0.33 0.62 0.388 0.612
In regional / municipal 
executive or legislative 
authorities
0.59 –0.44 –0.13 –0.44 0.76 0.24 0.52 0.266 0.734
In the law enforcement, 
military or security 
agencies
0.94 0.21 –0.17 –0.01 0.96 0.04 0.96 0.915 0.085
In entrepreneurship or 
management of other 
companies

















Figure. Scree plot with parallel analysis
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In activities that are socio-
political, scientific, 
educational
0.60 0.04 0.15 –0.14 0.40 0.60 0.61 0.378 0.622
Eigenvalue* 2.84 1.09 0.77 0.51 2.63
Percentage of variance 
explained**
0.35 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.33
Cumulative percentage of 
variance explained
0.35 0.49 0.59 0.65 0.33
N o t es: F1, F2, F3 and F3 represent unrotated factor loadings using the principal axis method; h2 — measure 
of variable communality; u2 — measure of variable uniqueness; *eigenvalue and **the percentage of variance ex-
plained are represented for each factor.
The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) test was 
also carried out, the KMO coefficient was 61%, 
which indicates the applicability of factor 
analysis. However, the value is small and in-
dicates a “mediocre” intercorrelation relation-
ship. Thus, we cannot talk about the existence 
of unobservable factors that lead to the pres-
ence of any combination of director experience. 
Boards of directors of companies differ in the 
degree of diversity of their experience.
3.2. BoD work experience diversity 
and company’s performance
The influence of relative work experience 
diversity on the change in the deviation of 
return on capital from the sector average from 
2017 to 2019 is shown in Table 7.
All OLS specifications of the model are sig-
nificant and show a high coefficient of determi-
nation — from 42 to 44% 4. An increase in the 
relative diversity index leads to an increase in 
the ROSF relative to the sector average from 
2017 to 2019. The influence of the base devia-
tion of the ROSF in 2017 has a negative influ-
ence on the change over two years: the higher 
is its initial level, the lower the growth of the 
ROSF from 2017 to 2019. That is, it is more 
difficult for more efficient companies to main-
tain development at the same level due to di-
4 The test for multicollinearity of variables (VIF) 
showed that the variance inflation factors are small, 
there is no multicollinearity (Appendix, Table 1).
minishing returns on investment. The presence 
of foreign ownership in non-public companies 
negatively affects the change in the return on 
equity, the difference is about 50% compared 
to companies without foreign owners. This can 
be explained by the negative role of sanctions 
of 2014. The work diversity positively affects 
the company’s performance in the case of com-
bining management and ownership functions, 
and the separation of functions reduces the 
growth of return on equity by 13–15%. 
Coefficients for the control variables of size, 
age, and industry were found to be insignificant. 
The absence of the influence of industry affili-
ation can be explained by the fact that the de-
pendent variable is calculated as the deviation 
of the return on capital from the sector average, 
that is, its specific was taken into account ini-
tially. It is also possible that standard errors of 
a given variable are too large and obscure the 
effect [Fahlenbrach, Low, Stulz, 2010].
Specifications with the relative number of 
experience types or categories showed similar 
results, which indicates their sustainability 
(Appendix, Table 2). Similarly, the impact of 
the work diversity on the ROCE was tested. 
The results were almost identical5. 
To further check the robustness of the re-
sults, the dependence of the binary variable of 
the change in the deviation of the ROSF relative 
to the sector average from 2017 to 2019 was 
assessed. The results are presented in Table 8.
5 The results can be submitted by the authors 
upon request.
Table 6 (end)
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Table 7




М1 М2 М3 М4 М5 М6
Constant term –5.445 –2.307 –6.905 –1.550 –10.246 –9.368
Diversity index 82.072*** 97.333*** 95.321*** 99.585*** 96.998*** 101.243***
Deviation of ROSF  
from the sector  
average in 2017
–0.748*** –0.762*** –0.762*** –0.760*** –0.764*** –0.765***
Presence of foreign 
ownership
–48.978*** –46.244*** –46.351*** –46.406*** –48.928*** –49.082***
Management separated 
from ownership
–15.185** –15.143** –14.712* –13.592* –14.807*
Number of markets 3.271 3.920 4.818 5.439
Firm size –1.350 –0.686 –1.413
Foundation year Yes Yes
Industry Yes
Number of observations 373 361 361 358 358 358
R2 0.421 0.430 0.432 0.431 0.432 0.440
Significance of the model 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N o t es: ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively; variables which are not 
used in the regression are set to blank.
Table 8




М7 М8 М9 М10 М11 М12
Constant term + + + + + +
Diversity index +* +** +** +** +** +**
Deviation of ROSF from 
the sector average in 
2017
–*** –*** –*** –*** –*** –***
Presence of foreign 
ownership
– – – – – –
Management separated 
from ownership
– – – – –
Number of markets – – – –
Firm size – – –
Foundation year Yes Yes
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М7 М8 М9 М10 М11 М12
Industry Yes***
Number of observations 373 361 361 358 358 358
Log likelihood –217 –210 –210 –208 –207 –186
Pseudo R2 (McFadden) 0.176 0.202 0.204 0.210 0.215 0.293
Percent correctly pre-
dicted, %
71.6 72.0 72.0 72.3 72.9 76.3
N o t es: only signs of the coefficients are given: the “+” sign means a positive relationship, the “–” sign — a 
negative; ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively; variables which are not used 
in the regression are set to blank; coefficients of control dummy variables of foundation year and industry are not 
presented for brevity; “Yes” is written if used.
Table 8 (end)
In all specifications, a significant effect was 
found for the relative diversity index. At the 
10% significance level in the M7 model with a 
few independent variables and the 5% signifi-
cance level in the M8–M12 specifications. An 
increase in the work experience diversity index 
increases the likelihood of an improvement in 
a company’s ROSF. In all specifications, the 
deviation of return on capital from the sector 
average in 2017 negatively affects the likeli-
hood of performance improvement, this is the 
effect of the “high base”. Foreign ownership 
variables, separation of management from 
ownership, and the number of markets do not 
affect the likelihood of performance improve-
ment, nor do control variables of size and foun-
dation year. In binary models, the industry of 
the business turned out to be significant at 1% 
level for three sectors — the forestry and wood-
working industry, the production of non-me-
tallic products, and electrical and electronic 
engineering. Note a fairly high percentage of 
correct predictions of models — up to 76%6. 
Specifications with alternative measures of 
6 For the convenience of interpreting binary pro-
bit models, the marginal effects of the M7–M12 
specifications were evaluated (Appendix, Table 3).
diversity showed similar results (Appendix, 
Table 2).
To test the robustness of the results, mod-
els with an alternative indicator ROCE were 
tested. In the final specification M12, the di-
versity index is significant at 10% level and 
with a positive coefficient. Similar to the 
analysis of the change in ROSF deviation, there 
is an effect of the high base — the performance 
indicator for 2017 negatively and significant-
ly affects the likelihood of ROCE improving. 
At the same time, the M12 model showed the 
influence of the foundation year and industry.
We emphasize that for additional verifica-
tion of the robustness of the results for all 
specifications above, other values of the coef-
ficient k were used for the calculation of the 
work experience diversity index (including the 
coefficients 0.7 and 0.9), the results do not 
differ significantly.
In general, the work experience diversity 
has a positive influence on the return on capi-
tal of companies, the coefficient of the diver-
sity index is significant for all given specifica-
tions, which indicates the reliability of the 
results. For OLS specifications, the coefficients 
of alternative work experience diversity indi-
cators also turned out to be significant; for 
binary models, these indicators were signifi-
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cant when the control variables were included. 
In addition to the indicator of the work experi-
ence diversity, the the improvement of the 
company’s performance is influenced by the 
initial position of the company — it is easier 
for companies with operating results below the 
industry average in 2017 to improve results 
in two years, compared to companies that were 
more successful initially. The use of an alterna-
tive indicator of the company’s performance 
gave similar results, which confirms their ro-
bustness.
CONCLUSION
The modern literature shows mixed results on 
the influence of different work experiences of 
the board on the performance of companies. 
The majority of papers considered the role of 
one or another type of experience. In this paper 
on Russian non-public industrial companies, 
for the first time, the work experience diver-
sity was analyzed, considering the collective 
experience of the board. To measure the expe-
rience diversity, three indicators were taken: 
the number of work experience types (there 
were nine), the number of work experience 
aggregated categories (four categories), and 
the diversity index proposed by the authors. 
The diversity index is a more detailed indicator 
that takes into account the “saturation” of 
each category, that is, the share of experience 
presented in that category. In this case, the 
diversity index by construction takes into ac-
count the “bias” towards any work experience 
category. The particular strength of the data 
should be mentioned — the data was taken 
from the survey and represents the firms’ top-
management perspective.
Factor analysis has shown that there are no 
prevailing combinations of work experience 
inherent in Russian industrial companies. The 
hypothesis H1 was thus confirmed.
Next, the relationship between company 
performance and work experience diversity 
was assessed. Since the data from non-public 
companies was used, the company’s return on 
capital (an indicator that was calculated based 
on financial statements) was taken as a vari-
able of company’s performance, rather than 
the market value. The directors’ work experi-
ence diversity was measured by one of three 
relative indicators: the ratio of the number of 
work experience types to the number of stake-
holders, the ratio of the number of work expe-
rience categories and the diversity index to the 
number of stakeholders. The main task of cor-
porate governance is to prevent conflicts be-
tween all stakeholders, to find compromises 
between their interests, so directors should 
have different skills and work experience. In 
other words, in successful companies, a great-
er variety of work experiences must correspond 
to a larger number of stakeholders, or relative 
work experience diversity should be higher.
A significant positive effect of the BoD work 
experience diversity on the return on capital 
was found. This result was noted for most 
specifications using alternative dependent 
variables and measures of diversity, as well as 
two methods of regression analysis. This indi-
cates the robustness of the results obtained 
and confirms the hypothesis H2. The main task 
of the councils is to take into account the in-
terests of all stakeholders and find compromise 
solutions. The more different stakeholders a 
company has, the more tasks the board of di-
rectors can face, and the more directors’ com-
petencies are required for better business per-
formance. The impact of the work experience 
diversity on changes in the company’s perfor-
mance from 2017 to 2019 was assessed, while 
the data on the board work experience was 
collected for 2017. Therefore, the problem of 
endogeneity in terms of the inverse relation-
ship between the work experience diversity and 
the company’s performance was mostly elimi-
nated.
Obtained results are in line with research 
where the positive effect of the increased 
variety of directors’ qualities on the value of 
the company was shown [Anderson et al., 
2011] and the importance of the combined 
effect of the directors’ diversity was noted 
[Bernile, Bhagwat, Yonker, 2018]. At the 
same time current results are contrary to 
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results of A. Knyazeva with coauthors and R. 
Adams with coauthors who showed that great-
er diversity leads to the lack of focus and 
consensus on boards [Knyazeva, Knyazeva, 
Raheja, 2013; Adams, Akyol, Verwijmeren, 
2018]. However, it should be noted that afore-
mentioned works are based on the data of pub-
licly traded companies in developed countries, 
while the current research was focused on the 
impact of the board of directors’ work experi-
ence diversity on the performance of Russian 
non-public companies. Regarding literature 
on Russian companies in general, the study 
confirms the resource role of the board of direc-
tors played in companies in terms of positive 
effects of director work experience in the com-
pany and in the industry [Dulyak, 2015] and 
in terms of positive influence of director past 
experience in the BoD of the other companies 
[Berezinets, Ilina, Loginova, 2019] on the firm 
performance.
This research showed the importance of the 
board work experience diversity and shed the 
light on the role of BoD in non-public compa-
nies. The actual board performance may depend 
on the tasks faced by companies, which in turn 
relate to firm performance and director qual-
ities and skills. Future research could examine 
the link between tasks, firm performance and 
the diversity of the BoD.
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Разнообразие опыта работы членов советов директоров российских компаний 
и эффективность бизнеса
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«Высшая школа экономики», Россия 
Цель исследования — эмпирически оценить влияние разнообразия опыта работы членов 
советов директоров на эффективность непубличных российских компаний. В качестве 
показателей разнообразия используется предложенный авторами индекс разнообразия, а 
также количество видов и количество категорий опыта работы у членов совета. Российским 
советам не присуще высокое разнообразие, преобладают директора с опытом работы на 
данном предприятии, на втором и третьем месте отмечены опыт работы на других предпри-
ятиях данной отрасли и в своей группе компаний. Установлено, что не существует превали-
рующих комбинаций опыта работы в промышленных компаниях. Обнаружено положитель-
ное влияние разнообразия опыта работы директоров на рост рентабельности капитала 
компаний в период с 2017 по 2019 г. Анализ базируется на данных опроса руководителей 
промышленных предприятий, проведенного НИУ ВШЭ в 2018 г.
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Fig. 1. Distribution of Russian companies by 20 types of economic activities
B a s e d  o n: database of the survey of manufacturing enterprises top management conducted by 
the IIMS of the NRU HSE; the description of economic activity codes is taken from Federal State 
Statistics Service website. URL: https://rosstat.gov.ru/classification.
N o t e s: 10 — Food production, 23 — Textile production, 28 — Production of clothes, 25 — 
Production of leather, leather goods, shoes, 26 — Wood processing and manufacture of wood and 
cork, except furniture, manufacture of straw and weaving materials , 22 — Manufacture of pulp, 
paper, cardboard and products from them, 20 — Manufacture of coke and oil products, 27  — 
Chemical production, 33 — Production of medicines and materials used for medical purposes, 
30 — Rubber and plastic products manufacture, 24 — Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral 
products, 14 — Metallurgical manufacture, 29 — Manufacture of finished metal products, except 
for machinery and equipment production, 16 — Manufacture of computers, electronics and optical 
equipment, 17 — Production of electronic machines and equipment, 21 — Manufacture of machinery 
and equipment not included in other groups, 31 — Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers, 13 — Manufacture of other vehicles and equipment, 15 — Furniture production, 
19 — Repair and installation of machinery and equipment.
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Fig. 2. Distribution of Russian companies by size (number of employees)
B a s e d  o n: database of the survey of manufacturing enterprises top management conducted by 
the IIMS of the NRU HSE; the description of economic activity codes is taken from Federal State 
Statistics Service website. URL: https://rosstat.gov.ru/classification (accessed: 09.11.2020).
Table 1
Variance inflation factor estimation for OLS models
Variable
Model
М1 М2 М3 М4 М5 М6
Diversity index 1.01 1.05  1.05 1.06 1.07 1.12
Deviation of ROSF from 
the sector average in 
2017
1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.03 1.03
Presence of foreign 
ownership
1.02 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.11 1.14
Management separated 
from ownership
1.09 1.09 1.15 1.19 1.22
Number of markets 1.01 1.07 1.10 1.16
Firm size 1.11 1.27 1.32
Foundation year 1.33 1.53
Industry 1.41
N o t e: variance inflation factors for variables which are not used in the regression are set to blank.
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Table 2
The impact of the relative number of work experience types and categories  




М6 М6 М12 М12
Constant term –16.144 –21.166 + +
Relative number of work experience types 16.575*** +**
Relative number of work experience categories 20.606 *** +**
Deviation of ROSF from the sector average in 2017 –0.766*** –0.767*** –*** –***
Presence of foreign ownership –48.464*** –48.921*** – –
Management separated from ownership –14.443* –14.303* – –
Number of markets 5.757 6.599 – –
Firm size –1.338 –1.229 – –
Foundation year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes*** Yes***
Number of observations 358 358 358 358
Log likelihood –186 –187
R2 or Pseudo R2 (McFadden) 0.440 0.442 0.291 0.290
Percent correctly predicted, % 76.8 76.0
Significance of the model 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N o t es: only signs of the coefficients are given for probit models, the “+” sign means a positive relationship, 
the “–” sign — a negative; ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Variables 
which are not used in the regression are set to blank. Coefficients of control dummy variables of foundation year 
and industry are not presented for brevity, “Yes” is written if used. For probit models Log likelihood and percent 
of correct predictions is given.
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Table 3
Marginal effects for binary probit models
Variable
Model
М7 М8 М9 М10 М11 М12
Diversity index 0.49* 0.60**  0.62** 0.66** 0.65** 0.71**
Deviation of ROSF from the 
sector average in 2017
–0.01*** –0.01*** –0.01*** –0.01*** –0.01*** –0.01***
Presence of foreign ownership –0.15 –0.13 –0.13 –0.14 –0.15 –0.17
Management separated from 
ownership
–0.05 –0.06 –0.06 –0.06 –0.07
Number of markets –0.04 –0.03 –0.03 –0.05
Firm size (logarithm of the 
number of employees in 2017) 
–0.01 –0.01 –0.02
Foundation year 1 — before 1992 — base category
Foundation year 2 —  
1992–1998
–0.13 –0.06
Foundation year 3 —  
1999–2008
0.01 0.01
Foundation year 4 —  
2009–2013
0.02 0.03
Foundation year 5 —  
2014–2018
–0.14 –0.16
Industry 1, food — base category
Industry 2, textiles and gar-
ments
0.17*
Industry 3, timber and wood-
working
–0.37***
Industry 4, chemicals 0.10
Industry 5, non-metallic 
products
0.23 ***
Industry 6, metals and fabri-
cated metal products
–0.06
Industry 7, metals and fabri-
cated metal products
–0.17
Industry 8, electrical, electron-
ic, and optical equipment
0.30***
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Variable
Model
М7 М8 М9 М10 М11 М12
Industry 9, transport vehicles 
and equipment
–0.03
N o t es: ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively; marginal effects of variables 
which are not used in the regression are set to blank.
Table 3 (end)
